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INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago, Professor William Stuntz wrote an article,
The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, that has become a
classic of the field. His thesis was that criminal law is beset by
political problems (mostly collusive incentives) that cause it to
steadily expand, with ever more statutes criminalizing ever more
conduct, and punishing more harshly as well:
[T]he story of American criminal law is a story of tacit cooperation between prosecutors and legislators, each of whom
benefits from more and broader crimes, and growing marginalization of judges, who alone are likely to opt for narrower
liability rules rather than broader ones. . . .
So two kinds of politics drive criminal law. Surface politics, the sphere in which public opinion and partisan argument operate, ebb and flow, just as crime rates ebb and flow.
Usually these conventional political forces push toward
broader liability, but not always, and not always to the same
degree. A deeper politics, a politics of institutional
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competition and cooperation, always pushes toward broader
liability rules, and toward harsher sentences as well.1
This Article asks what these political patterns mean for statutory interpretation. If the text of criminal statutes is, due to the
pathological political patterns Stuntz identified, unreasonably
broad, does it make sense to be a textualist in the criminal law
context? When criminal legislation is written instrumentally—
designed to effectuate a regime of plea bargaining rather than to
identify the conduct that a legislature actually wants stopped—
what is a judge determined to act as a faithful agent to do? Or is
the faithful agent model not the right one for such cases? What
approach to interpreting criminal statutes would lead to just case
outcomes? What approach would be best—if any would make a
difference at all—for curbing the excesses of punitiveness in this
era of crisis in U.S. criminal justice?
These issues have come up in an interesting array of prominent cases since the “textualist revolution” got underway. Consider, for example, United States v. Marshall,2 a 1990s case in
which the defendants faced five- or ten-year mandatory minimums for dealing LSD under statutory text that made the penalty turn on the weight of any “mixture or substance containing a
detectable amount” of the drug.3 The defense and dissent argued
that this reading might work for heroin or cocaine (to which the
statutory scheme also applied) but not for LSD because LSD is
virtually weightless: it is sold in a variety of carrier mediums,
such as blotter paper, sugar cubes, or orange juice, which vastly
outweigh the LSD combined with them.4 Applying the statutory
language literally would mean a serious dealer could get a short
sentence if he kept his LSD in pure form or on small pieces of
blotter paper, while a minor dealer could get a long sentence if he
used big pieces of blotter paper and a staggering one if he used
sugar cubes or orange juice.5 That isn’t so much tough on crime
as just irrational. As Judge Richard Posner wrote in dissent,

1
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 510 (2001) (emphasis in original).
2
908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Chapman v. United States,
500 U.S. 453 (1991).
3
Id. at 1315 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(v), (B)(v)).
4
See id. at 1315–16.
5
See id. at 1315–16; id. at 1331–33 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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“[E]ven the Justice Department cannot explain the why of the
punishment scheme that it is defending.”6
But Judge Frank Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit
en banc, stated that “[i]t is not possible to construe the words of
§ 841 to make the penalty turn on the net weight of the drug rather than the gross weight of carrier and drug.”7 The only question, then, was whether LSD “sits on blotter paper as oil floats on
water” or whether it blends with blotter paper in such a way as to
constitute a “mixture.”8 “Because the fibers absorb the alcohol,”
Judge Easterbrook concluded, “the LSD solidifies inside the paper
rather than on it.”9 Judgment for the state. The Supreme Court,
in an opinion authored by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, affirmed the judgment and the textualist reasoning on which it
rested.10 From the standpoint of rational sentencing policy—of
retribution and deterrence, for example—the absorption chemistry of blotter paper should not determine a defendant’s fate. But
the very point of textualism is to exclude such higher-order considerations of policy and purpose from the interpretive domain.
Or consider another case from the 1990s textualist revolution: Brogan v. United States.11 Writing for the Court, Justice
Antonin Scalia ruled that simply (but falsely) denying wrongdoing when questioned by federal investigators constitutes a
“false statement” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1001:12 “Whoever . . . knowingly and willfully . . . makes any false, fictitious or
fraudulent statements . . . shall be fined . . . or imprisoned.”13 Federal circuit courts had long recognized an exception to the literal
application of the statute for the “exculpatory no” (a mere denial
of guilt, like “I didn’t do it,” in response to an investigator’s questions)14 since the tendency to blurt out a denial under sudden

6

Id. at 1333 (Posner, J., dissenting).
Marshall, 908 F.2d at 1317 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(v), (B)(v)).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10 Chapman, 500 U.S at 461–63.
11 522 U.S. 398 (1998).
12 Id. at 400–02.
13 Id. at 400 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1001).
14 See, e.g., Moser v. United States, 18 F.3d 469, 473–74 (7th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 801, 803–05 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Equihua-Juarez,
851 F.2d 1222, 1225–26 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 182–85
(4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Tabor, 788 F.2d 714, 716–19 (11th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Fitzgibbon, 619 F.2d 874, 876–77 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Chevoor,
526 F.2d 178, 182–83 (1st Cir. 1975); Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 305
(5th Cir. 1962).
7

1794

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:8

questioning is so instinctive that courts did not think that it rose
to the level of studied lie that the statute was meant to target—
plus, the absence of such an exception rendered a lot of people
felons and made it easy for prosecutors to stack charges.15 But,
said the Supreme Court in 1998, “petitioner concedes that under
a ‘literal reading’ of the statute he loses.”16
Was there any reason to depart from a literal reading? Not
legislative purpose: “[I]t is not, and cannot be, our practice to restrict the unqualified language of a statute to the particular evil
that Congress was trying to remedy.”17 Not prudence: the risk of
“prosecutorial abuse” through “overzealous prosecutors . . . ‘piling
on’ offenses” is for Congress to consider, not the courts.18 And not
larger principles of criminal justice: “[I]t may well be” that, absent
an “exculpatory no” exception, the statute is “harsh,” but the instances in which a court may override a statute’s text out of concern
for punitive excess are only those “set forth in the Constitution.”19
For example, punitive excess may rise in extreme cases to the
level of an Eighth Amendment violation but cannot justify a limiting interpretation of a statute.20
At bottom, Mr. Brogan’s problem was that there was simply
no law, as the Court understood the meaning of “law,” undergirding his position: “In sum, we find nothing to support the ‘exculpatory no’ doctrine except the many Court of Appeals decisions that
have embraced it.”21 But that was true only because the Court had
already removed so many types of arguments—arguments, again,
from purpose, prudence, and larger principles of criminal justice—from the category of “law.”
Or consider, for example, Bond v. United States22 from 2014.
Carol Bond put an irritant powder on her romantic rival’s car
15 See, e.g., Cogdell, 844 F.2d at 183–84 (“This test permits the broad use of section 1001 against false statements that impede normal governmental functions, while at
the same time, protecting defendants from prosecutorial overkill or invasion of areas bordering on the constitutional protection against forced self-incrimination.”); United States
v. Bedore, 455 F.2d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1972) (“From the statutory history, it is evident
that section 1001 was . . . [intended] only [to reach] false statements that might support
fraudulent claims against the Government, or that might pervert or corrupt the authorized functions of those agencies to whom the statements were made.”).
16 Brogan, 522 U.S. at 401 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 5, Brogan, 522 U.S. 398
(No. 96-1579)).
17 Id. at 403.
18 Id. at 405.
19 Id. at 407.
20 Id.
21 Brogan, 522 U.S. at 408.
22 572 U.S. 844 (2014).
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door, mailbox, and doorknob.23 Prosecutors indicted her for using
a “chemical weapon” in violation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention Implementation Act24 on the grounds that the statute
by its terms encompasses “any chemical which through its chemical
action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation
or permanent harm.”25 As the circuit court pointed out, that definition taken literally would turn every “kitchen cupboard and
cleaning cabinet in America into a potential chemical weapons
cache”26—yet the circuit court nonetheless upheld the conviction,
as it did not think that it had any choice but to take the definition
literally.27
One final example: In Yates v. United States28 in 2015, John
Yates got caught with fish that were shorter than federal regulations allowed and ordered a crew member to throw them back in
the water to avoid a ticket.29 Prosecutors charged him with destroying evidence under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a statute aimed
at corporate document shredding, on the grounds that the statute
by its terms encompassed “any record, document, or tangible object.”30 As the prosecutors (and district and circuit courts) saw it,
anything possessing a physical form is a “tangible object,” including a fish.31
Carol Bond and John Yates eventually won their cases in the
Supreme Court—but only because a majority of the Court did not
accept the textualist approach advocated by those on the other
side.32 And it was a close call: a number of the Justices took issue
with the Court’s nontextualist approach (the cases provoked a
flurry of concurrences and dissents),33 the district and circuit
courts endorsed the textualist approach, and, crucially, the prosecutors entrusted with the cases endorsed that approach. Judicial
statutory interpretation, as I will argue at length later, is not the
23

Id. at 852.
22 U.S.C. §§ 6701–6771.
25 Bond, 572 U.S. at 851 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 229F(8)(A)).
26 United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 154 n.7 (3d Cir. 2012), rev’d, 572 U.S. 844 (2014).
27 Id. at 155.
28 574 U.S. 528 (2015).
29 Id. at 533–34.
30 Id. at 534–36, 544 (quoting 18 U.S.C § 1519).
31 See id. at 534–35 (first citing United States v. Yates, No. 2:10-cr-66-FtM-29SPC,
2011 WL 3444093, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2011); and then citing United States v. Yates,
733 F.3d 1059, 1064 (11th Cir. 2013)).
32 See Bond, 572 U.S. at 860–66; Yates, 574 U.S. at 535–48.
33 See, e.g., Bond, 572 U.S. at 867–73 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Yates,
574 U.S. at 552–70 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
24
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only thing that matters in criminal law. Prosecutors are criminal
law’s first interpreters and, because of plea bargaining, typically
its last interpreters as well. Judicial practice sets an interpretive
stage, but the meaning of criminal statutes then depends on how
prosecutors read them and whether defense attorneys can plausibly push back against those readings.
There is a reason for this odd conjunction of punitiveness and
textualism—or, to be more precise, punitiveness and a certain
kind of 1990s-style, rule-oriented textualism (more on that
later)—in criminal cases. Pathological politics have textual consequences. When judges apply criminal statutes’ text as written
against the backdrop of the kind of politics Stuntz identified, the
effect is to unleash statutes that are unreasonable as written. In
short, the pathological politics of criminal law bear on statutory
text and therefore on the merits and demerits, in the criminal
context, of textualism. Textualism might have many virtues in
other areas of law—my argument here is agnostic on that score—
but it is an exceedingly problematic fit in criminal law. When the
politics of criminal legislation leads to statutory text that is careless, judges have no means to correct the mistakes. When the text
is unreasonably punitive, judges have no means to temper the punitiveness in application. When the text is instrumental, judges
have no means to see past the instrumentalism.
That is the core argument—the argument of Part I. But it
carries two further implications.
The first is about stakes—that is, about the connection between these relatively arcane questions of statutory methodology
and the urgent issues of punitiveness and mass incarceration that
afflict U.S. criminal justice today. As Part II argues, interpretive
approaches in criminal law start with judges, but they don’t end
there; they fan out to prosecutors, defense attorneys, and juries
and from appellate opinions to prosecutors’ charging practices,
trials, the vast array of trial court proceedings short of trials, jury
deliberations, and, above all, plea bargains. Again, the issue is
that criminal law exists in an odd political economy in which
judges set the terms for how criminal statutes will be read but do
not typically determine case outcomes. Judicial textualism unleashes throughout the system a technocratic punitiveness that
contributes—marginally, but not insignificantly—to U.S. criminal law’s present harshness. Ultimately, statutory methodology
in criminal law is a doorway to a style of governance, and the style
of governance that textualism fosters in the criminal system is
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one of a machinelike bureaucracy that bleeds away the dignified
commitment to judicial restraint and democratic authority for
which textualism is rightly admired, leaving only bare, hard rules
and a great deal of punishment.
The second implication is about the justifications on which
textualism—or, at least, one traditional form of textualism—is
based: justifications of democratic authority, judicial restraint,
rule of law, and constitutional design. As Part III argues, the political structures that so distort criminal legislation also bear on
these justifications. Some of the justifications supporting textualism do not make sense in the criminal context. Others become
distorted. Others become weaker. And still others simply become
very puzzling: What, for example, is a judge who wishes to act as
a faithful agent to do about instrumental law—that is, law that
was drafted with prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining in
mind and which is therefore not designed to be applied as written?
Enforce it as written anyway? If what the legislation is really
meant to do is empower prosecutors to secure plea bargains, does
a faithful agent of the legislature effectuate that structure? Is doing so consistent with the rule of law? Part III works through
these questions—and, of course, the existing literature about
some of them—concluding that, while the considerations are complicated, the case for textualism is unusually weak in the criminal
context. And it is weak on its own terms, on the basis of its own
animating justifications.
Finally, a few provisos are necessary before the argument can
get underway.
First, the term “textualism” might be too broad: textualist
statutory methodologies come in different varieties, and some of
them may have resources to deal with criminal law’s strange politics. My target here is a specific type of textualism, associated
with Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook, that joins a broadly
textual orientation to three more distinctive elements: a conviction that textual ambiguities should be resolved by reference to
semantic rather than policy context;34 a conviction that judges
cannot deviate from clear text even if unreasonable in

34 See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 70, 73, 76 (2006) (arguing that, although textualists increasingly acknowledge context sensitivity in language, “[t]extualists give precedence to semantic context—evidence
that goes to the way a reasonable person would use language under the circumstances.
Purposivists give priority to policy context—evidence that suggests the way a reasonable
person would address the mischief being remedied” (emphasis in original)).
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application;35 and a conception of legal interpretation and thus
the judicial role under which it is inappropriate for considerations
of policy, principle, or other values to bear on judges’ duty to say
what the law is.36 Taking text seriously is, by itself, unsurprising
and unobjectionable in all law; that is not my target. My target is
the above combination of text and opposition to values-based judicial discretion. I would also suggest that it is this combination
of ideas, and not merely an orientation to statutory text, that constitutes the new formalism that has had such profound impact on
American law—but that is a large claim not defended here.
Second, I am not endorsing any one alternative to textualism.
Criminal law’s strange politics justify a more active judicial hand
than Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook’s textualism allows,
but that does not necessarily mean purposivism of the legal process, Hart and Sacks sort, or constructive interpretation of the
Dworkinian sort, or dynamic interpretation of the Eskridge sort.37
It is a feature, not a bug, that this Article criticizes one very specific thing while leaving open a range of possible alternatives. The
question ultimately is whether criminal statutes should be
treated as a system of textually given, bare rules. What I mean to
defend in the final analysis is the practice, under whatever label,
of making equitable arguments about what criminal statutes
mean.
Third, the facets of criminal law that I’m identifying as problematic for textualism are all contingent: they do not go to the
nature of criminal law as an enterprise or apply to criminal legislation across all times and places. I do think that there are features of criminal law—its moral orientation, for example—that
bear noncontingently on the proper interpretation of criminal
statutes. But my argument here turns on considerations of political structure that could be otherwise. Yet this is not a shallow
contingency, which could change with the political winds. It is
grounded, as was Stuntz’s, in structural features of politics—like
the existence of plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion, the
35 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 63–64, 68–69 (1994).
36 See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 3, 23–47 (Amy Guttman ed., 1997).
37 See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
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interest-group character of U.S. democracy, and the limited funding for criminal justice—that are fairly stable.
Fourth, my arguments are mainly about contemporary criminal legislation. There is a fissure in criminal law between statutes that codified the common law and contemporary statutes. As
Stuntz wrote:
[C]riminal law is not one field but two. The first consists of a
few core crimes, the sort that are used to compile the FBI’s
crime index—murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery, arson,
assault, kidnapping, burglary, larceny, and auto theft. The
second consists of everything else. Criminal law courses,
criminal law literature, and popular conversation about
crime focus heavily on the first. The second dominates criminal codes.
These two fields have dramatically different histories.
The law that defines core crimes derives from the common
law of England. Save for auto theft, everything in the list of
FBI index crimes was a crime in Blackstone’s day. Along with
the rest of criminal law, these crimes were all codified during
the course of the nineteenth century, but their basic structure still bears the mark of their common law origins. . . .
. . . But when we turn our attention to the rest of criminal
law, a very different picture emerges. For the most part, this
criminal law was the product of legislation, not judicial decision. And the central feature of its history is growth.38
My arguments in this Article simply do not bear on statutes that
straightforwardly codify the common law. At the same time, a lot
rides on that word “straightforwardly” because many traditional
crimes have been affected by contemporary patterns of legislation. The “core crimes” on Stuntz’s list are rarely unaffected by
contemporary legislative patterns.
I. POLITICAL DYSFUNCTION, TEXTUAL CONSEQUENCES
What are the pathological political structures that make the
crafting of criminal law so dysfunctional, and how do they affect
the text of criminal statutes? How does reading those statutes
from a textual point of view then lead to an excessively punitive
criminal system? The object of this section is to answer those
questions. The argument, in brief, is that the making of criminal
38

Stuntz, supra note 1, at 512–13 (emphasis in original).
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law suffers from a profound political imbalance between the parties affected by criminal legislation; collusive incentives that lead
legislatures to write statutes designed to arm prosecutors and
grease the wheels of plea bargaining rather than to define the
conduct legislatures actually want to stop; and a lawmaking context that unleashes punitive impulses. The statutes that result
would lead to a harsh system of criminal law even if regularly
interpreted and applied by textualist judges. But they are not regularly interpreted and applied by judges; they are fed back into a
bureaucratized criminal system aimed at mass justice and based
on plea bargaining. The result, as explored in Part II, is a “them’s
the rules” criminal system in which guilt is often automatic and
equitable arguments cannot play a role.
A. Political Imbalance
The making of criminal law exhibits profound political imbalance among the groups with an interest in the legislation. When
Disney and Google square off over copyright law, with Disney
pushing for more copyright protection and Google for less, both
are powerful enough to make their interests heard.39 That dynamic more or less holds in many other legislative arenas as well,
such as organized labor versus organized capital, landlords versus tenants, and medical insurers versus the plaintiffs’ bar. The
various groups’ power and money are often unequal but typically
sufficient to ensure that all parties’ interests have some weight in
the legislative process; that errors and accidents of drafting are
caught and corrected; and that a bargaining process takes place
in which no one’s interests can be altogether trampled, if only because the sides have to make trades based on their priorities.
But criminal offenders are politically unpopular (they are almost by definition accused of having done something that violates
society’s basic norms), usually poor, disproportionately ethnic minorities, and often literally unable (due to felon disenfranchisement) to make themselves heard at the ballot box.40 Furthermore,
39 Compare Brief for the Motion Picture Ass’n of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 31–34, Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL
3561888, at *31–34 (urging the Court to uphold a statute extending copyright protection
to certain works previously in the public domain), with Brief for Google, Inc., as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 10–18, Golan, 565 U.S. 302 (No. 10-545), 2011 WL
2533006, at *10–18 (urging the Court to strike down the statute).
40 About 82% of state felony defendants in the seventy-five largest counties and 66% of
federal defendants are represented by public defenders or assigned counsel, about 57% of
prisoners are Black or Hispanic, and about 2.5% of the total U.S. voting-age population (one
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though far too numerous as a group, criminal offenders are a
small and scattered portion of the population, which makes it
hard for them to be an effective interest group. There is also a
timing problem: many of those who become criminal defendants
do not anticipate that they will commit a crime, let alone be arrested for one; they, therefore, do not politically advocate at time
one for their later interests at time two. Even those who do anticipate a chance of arrest—people involved in gangs, for example—
operate in secret and thus cannot defend their interests in the
democratic process. True, some organizations (the ACLU, for example) care about criminal defendants’ interests, and white-collar
defendants have more political power than most. Nonetheless, the
people on the wrong side of the criminal justice system are, when
conceptualized as a political interest group, extremely weak.
On the other side, prosecutors, police, and prison employees
have all been shown to wield significant influence in favor of
broader and more severe criminal law.41 Prosecutors are especially significant because they are often involved in drafting criminal law (which obviously affects statutory text) and because
many lawmakers are former prosecutors (which again affects
statutory text).42 These three groups are precisely the sort of organized, issue-focused interest holders most able to make their
preferences felt in the legislative process. The imbalance between

in forty adults) is disenfranchised because of a current or prior felony conviction. See
CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1
(2000), https://perma.cc/BYC7-FHCP; E. ANN CARSON & ELIZABETH ANDERSON, BUREAU OF
JUST. STAT., PRISONERS IN 2015, at 6 (2016), https://perma.cc/72QB-UZRN; Christopher Uggen, Ryan Larson & Sarah Shannon, 6 Million Lost Voters: State-Level Estimates of Felony
Disenfranchisement, 2016, SENT’G PROJECT (Oct. 6, 2016), https://perma.cc/HKL4-MBKH.
41 See Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 276–306 (2013) (describing how the structure of
the Department of Justice—which houses prosecutors, FBI agents, and prison employees—has led to severe federal criminal law).
42 See Wendy Sawyer & Alex Clark, New Data: The Rise of the “Prosecutor Politician”, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (July 13, 2017), http://perma.cc/2MDG-3QN4 (“Of those in
office at any point between 2007 and 2017, 38% of state attorneys general, 19% of governors, and 10% of U.S. senators had prosecutorial backgrounds.”). District-attorney associations have recently shown their ability to stop criminal-justice reform in its tracks. See,
e.g., Julia O’Donoghue, On Louisiana Criminal Justice Reform, Gov. John Bel Edwards,
DAs Reach Partial Compromise, TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/4D4Y
-7SLK (reporting that the Louisiana District Attorney Association and prosecutors “persuaded the governor to shelve a proposed overhaul of felony sentencing”); see also Jan
Moller, Prison Sentence Reform Efforts Face Tough Opposition in the Legislature, TIMESPICAYUNE (May 16, 2012), https://perma.cc/U783-FCCB (quoting a Louisiana state senator
as saying, “If you give a legislator the opportunity to go either with the Innocence Project
or with their DA, guess what? They’re going to vote with their DA.”).
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them and their counterparts on the criminal offending side is not
like the imbalance between landlords and tenants or organized
capital and organized labor. It is more like the imbalance between
citizens and noncitizens.
What consequences does political imbalance have for statutory text? There are two.
First is carelessness: drafting mistakes will not be corrected
or even noticed if no one in the legislative process has an interest
in catching and correcting them and some power to deploy to that
end. The LSD sentencing scheme in Marshall is an example so extreme as to be almost surreal. It was plainly an error. Sentencing
LSD by carrier-medium weight rather than by dose, such that
one dose in a sugar cube would lead to a longer sentence than a
hundred in pure form, isn’t tough on drugs or soft on drugs; it’s
just irrational. As Judge Posner wrote, “[T]he most plausible inference is that Congress simply did not realize how LSD is sold.”43
Well, where was the LSD lobby to point out the problem? The answer is that criminal enterprises whose membership operates in
secret do not generally have lobbies. And what about correction
once the problem had come to light? Marshall was, and is, a highvisibility case. The Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit, en banc,
wrote opinions; the Justice Department was directly involved;
and the Easterbrook-Posner clash made the case a staple of law
school courses on legislation and statutory interpretation.44
Surely, if any statutory error in criminal law were to lead to
legislative change, it would be this one. Did it? No. The text at
issue in Marshall—irrational, indefensible, known to all—is the
same today as it was when the case came up in 1990.45 Why? Because fixing bad statutory text isn’t just a matter of knowing that
it’s bad. Someone has to notice, care enough about the problem to
spend political capital fixing it, and have political capital to
spend. Indeed, that difficulty of problem-solving is true of governance in many settings; it is a deep fact about politics.
The second consequence of political imbalance is that statutory text will often fail to reflect the give-and-take of political

43

Marshall, 908 F.2d at 1333 (Posner, J., dissenting).
The case is in casebooks, including, for example, JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW
C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 252–68 (Robert C.
Clark et al. eds., 3d ed. 2013).
45 The offending text at issue in Marshall was the phrase “mixture or substance containing a detectable amount” in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(v) and (B)(v). Those two provisions contain the same text today.
44
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compromise. Professor John Manning has influentially defended
textualism on the grounds that only it preserves the political compromises ensconced in legislative texts.46 That is a good argument
when the opponents are Disney and Google. But in criminal law,
the response is: What legislative compromises? Consider, for example, the legislative process that led to a one-hundred-to-one
crack-to-powder cocaine sentencing differential. That differential
was not the result of a negotiation among competing interests
with, say, powder-cocaine dealers and users on one side, crackcocaine dealers and users on another, and police and prosecutors
on a third, all exerting pressure on legislators and ultimately
hammering out a deal all sides could live with. “In congressional
debates preceding passage of the bill,” Stuntz writes, “one member proposed a weight/sentencing ratio of twenty to one; another
suggested fifty to one. One hundred to one, the ratio finally enacted, was the highest anyone proposed. Crack-powder legislation
was the product of an auction, not a political compromise.”47
Lack of care and lack of compromise particularly characterize
contemporary federal criminal law. Consider the breadth of the
federal mail- and wire-fraud statutes, which, until recently, criminalized “basically, all serious breaches of fiduciary duty. . . . Professors who award degrees based on plagiarized work, and the
students who do the work, are guilty. College applicants who lie
on their applications are guilty. Political powerbrokers who use
their influence to get government jobs for friends are guilty.”48 Together with misrepresentation offenses, federal law currently
criminalizes “most lies (and . . . almost-but-not-quite-lies) one
might tell during the course of any financial transaction or transaction involving the government.”49 This network of criminalization reflects no real political compromises at all, no effort to discern and specify with care which breaches of fiduciary duty and
which false statements rise to a criminal level: “It is often said
that ordinary lying is not a crime—a comment usually made by
way of explaining the narrowness of the definition of perjury—
but the statement is wrong: a good deal of ordinary lying fits
46 See Manning, supra note 34, at 92 (“Textualists (again, myself included) believe
that the purposivist approach disregards the central place of legislative compromise embedded in both the constitutional structure and the corresponding congressional rules of
legislative procedure.”).
47 WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 173 (2013).
48 Stuntz, supra note 1, at 524. The reach of the statute was recently cut back, but
by the courts, not by Congress. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 403–09 (2010).
49 Stuntz, supra note 1, at 517.
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within the definition of one or another federal felony.”50 The only
real limitation on the mail- and wire-fraud statutes and other federal misrepresentation statutes is the jurisdictional hook: the
crimes are defined as broadly as federal power allows them to be.
Another example: consider the sheer frequency with which
federal criminal statutes use the word “any.” Promiscuous
“anys” are the bane of federal criminal law. Here, for example,
is Sarbanes-Oxley’s destruction-of-records provision—which,
along with its strings of overlapping nouns and verbs (obviously
intended to encompass as many types of objects and actions as it
imaginably could), contains no fewer than five “anys” in eightytwo words:
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct,
or influence the investigation or proper administration of any
matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency
of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in
relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall
be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years,
or both.51
The same is true of the federal bribery statute (“Whoever [ ]
directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises anything
of value to any public official . . . .”)52 or the federal false statements statute applicable to financial institutions (“Whoever
knowingly makes any false statement or report . . . for the purpose of influencing in any way the action [of a financial institution] . . . .”).53 Courts do not always read the word “any” literally.
They do not always do so in contract law, for example.54 To do so
in criminal law is a choice, and a choice that U.S. legal culture
made differently not long ago. Nearly all federal circuit courts
once read the federal false-statements statute just quoted, for example, to contain an implicit materiality requirement: “Whoever
knowingly makes any [material] false statement or report . . . .”55
50

Id. at 517–18.
18 U.S.C. § 1519 (emphasis added).
52 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (emphasis added).
53 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (emphasis added); see also the discussion of United States v.
Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997), infra note 57.
54 See generally, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage Co., 442 P.2d 641
(Cal. 1968).
55 18 U.S.C. § 1014.
51
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was the reigning understanding.56 But it is obviously in prosecutors’ interest to oppose that reading, and the Supreme Court turned
against it in United States v. Wells,57 a case decided in the same
1990s era of technocratic punitiveness as Brogan and Marshall.
And now? I have sometimes practiced criminal defense at a
large, urban courthouse. In my experience, a sort of amnesia has
settled over the profession. The statutory approach of cases like
Brogan, Marshall, and Wells represented an active and deliberate
effort to promote a particular interpretive theory: a group of lawyers and judges exquisitely aware of American law’s equity-andpurpose traditions sought to change how statutory interpretation
is done. But formalism and literalism are permanent temptations
of the lawyerly soul; it takes effort to prevent them from overtaking
the field. It was once the case that part of coming to law school
was being educated in a culture of interpretive flexibility. Students’ first instinct was to literally apply textual rules, and professors took it as one of their duties to induct students into a legal
culture in which “mechanical jurisprudence” was something to be
mocked.58 But cultural memory fades and, with it has gone the
memory of nonliteral interpretive possibilities that once seemed
obvious.
That is particularly true when one is dealing not with learned
visionaries of the law like Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook

56

See Wells, 519 U.S. at 486 n.3 (collecting cases).
519 U.S. 482 (1997). The decision was 8–1, with Justice John Paul Stevens arguing
in dissent that, back in 1948 when the statute was enacted, “Congress looked to the courts
to play an important role in the lawmaking process by relying on common-law tradition
and common sense to fill gaps in the law.” Id. at 509 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Back then,
“a different view of statutory interpretation held sway,” id. at 509, but, alas, “[t]he Court’s
approach to questions of statutory construction has changed significantly since that time.”
Id. at 510.
58 As late as 1986, Professor Ronald Dworkin could write:
57

The dissenting opinion [in an 1889 case] argued for a theory of legislation more
popular then than it is now. . . . It proposes that the words of a statute be given
what we might better call their acontextual meaning, that is, the meaning we
would assign them if we had no special information about the context of their
use or the intentions of their author. . . . Law students reading his opinion now
are mostly contemptuous of that way of constructing a statute from a text; they
say it is an example of mechanical jurisprudence.
DWORKIN, supra note 37, at 17–18 (discussing Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889)).
Marshall was decided just four years later. How times change! And how quickly, once the
change takes hold, the past is forgotten. Judge Easterbrook knew he was challenging custom; my students today just assume the literal approach. They have no idea that their
peers, from the victory of legal realism in the 1930s until the resurgence of text-and-rule
formalism in the 1990s, regarded that approach as something to be mocked.
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but with the ordinary lawyers and judges who staff the criminal
justice system. When I have worked with students in criminal litigation, for example, they typically cannot imagine not taking the
word “any” literally. When I have presented those same antiliteral arguments in courtrooms, older prosecutors and judges are
unfazed, while young prosecutors not only reject the argument
(which is their job) but often display confusion at the very proposal (which would have been considered incompetence thirty
years ago).
Thus, all those reckless “anys” in criminal statutes have become categorical by drift, as one generation’s revolution has become the next generation’s assumption. Understandings and
practices once common in the field have been forgotten. The result
is that the punitive scope of criminal statutes has broadened.
Note as well that the rule of lenity is no solution to problems
like those promiscuous “anys.” The rule of lenity is often disregarded in criminal cases, but, when it matters at all, the context
is typically that of ambiguous statutory language. Those “anys,”
like many other instances of carelessly sweeping statutory language in criminal law, are not ambiguous in the ordinary sense.
They are instances of clear text that cannot mean what it says.
The rule of lenity, as conventionally understood, is no help.
B. Collusive Incentives
The pathology that led to Stuntz’s famous title, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, was actually not the pathology
of political imbalance but that of perverse and collusive incentive
structures.59 To understand this second pathology, we must pause
over two procedural factors even more unique to the criminal system than its radically imbalanced politics: plea bargaining and
prosecutorial discretion. The former refers to prosecutors’ capacity
to settle criminal cases without juries or trials by trading reduced
charges or lenient sentencing recommendations for confessions.
The latter refers to prosecutors’ nearly unlimited discretion to
choose whether to bring charges and what charges to bring. The
two together mean that, even if new legislation made everyone
with two eyes a felon, the effect would not necessarily be to increase the number of people charged. It would only mean that
prosecutors could choose to prosecute almost anyone and, upon
doing so, could secure a conviction with minimal cost, time, risk
59

See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 529–45.
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of defeat at trial, jury supervision of the facts, and judicial supervision of the law. The combination of plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion is the engine of bureaucratic criminal justice.
But the engine runs on leverage: it cannot function unless the
underlying substantive law threatens but does not require severity. One way to provide leverage is through large sentencing
ranges with exceptional harshness at the top end. Another is
through lax double jeopardy standards and flexible understandings of what constitutes a single crime or count. But, as Stuntz
famously demonstrated, the most important means of giving prosecutors leverage is to fill the statute books with capaciously defined and overlapping crimes. When a given course of conduct can
be charged under different headings—when lying on mortgage
application documents, for example, can be charged as “falsification of records,” “bank fraud,” “manipulative and deceptive devices,” or, depending on the state of double jeopardy law and the
details of the conduct, combinations or multiple counts of those
charges60—defendants will plead guilty in exchange for prosecutors bringing fewer and less serious charges than the maximum
available to them. The advantage of this type of plea bargaining
(known as “charge bargaining”) is that, unlike sentence bargaining, it requires virtually no judicial cooperation: prosecutors can
do it almost entirely on their own. But it does not work in a statutory vacuum; it requires broad, overlapping definitions of crimes
that make guilt as easy to establish as possible. What makes plea
bargaining work is substantive criminal law.
Will legislatures provide the necessary kind of substantive
criminal law? As Stuntz argued, both prosecutors and legislatures
have an interest in a low-cost, high-conviction criminal system.61
Prosecutors want to get through their caseload (which is often
considerable, especially at the state level) and above all want to

60 See 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (“Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals,
covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document or tangible object . . . .”);
18 U.S.C. § 1344 (“Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice . . . to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property
owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution . . . .”); 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive device.”); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (“Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or
artifice . . . to obtain . . . any money or property in connection with the purchase or sale of
. . . any security of an issuer . . . .”).
61 Stuntz, supra note 1, at 537–38.
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win, since high conviction rates indicate professional success.62
Legislatures want effective crime enforcement on the cheap,
which means that they too want high conviction rates and no trials, so long as prosecutors don’t go after the kinds of people who
would create political problems in the next election—and prosecutors never have to, no matter what the statutes say, because of
prosecutorial discretion.63 Broad, redundant, harsh criminal statutes do not mean that everyone gets charged any more than low
speed limits mean that everyone gets a ticket. Such statutes only
mean that when prosecutors do bring charges, they win, and the
win doesn’t cost much.
Examining these incentives, Stuntz concludes that, underneath criminal law’s “surface politics” of tough-on-crime versus
soft-on-crime, which ebbs and flows, there is a “deep politics” of
institutional incentives that leads criminal legislation to steadily
expand.64 At bottom, what has happened in the political economy
of criminal law is a breakdown in the structure of checks and balances: “[E]ach branch is supposed to check the others,” Stuntz
writes, but “[i]nstead, the story of American criminal law is a
story of tacit cooperation between prosecutors and legislators. . . .
Prosecutors are better off when criminal law is broad than when
it is narrow. Legislators are better off when prosecutors are better
off.”65 And the judiciary? The point of plea bargaining is to avoid
the judiciary—and juries along with them. Broad statutes
squeeze out the third branch.
A point that I think Stuntz overlooks is that a regime of plea
bargaining demands criminal statutes that are not only broad but
also rule-like—a criminal law of rules rather than standards—
because standards tend to leave guilt in doubt, while rules can be
drafted in such a way that, in many cases, guilt is manifest. In
Wells, for example, the Supreme Court held that bank-statement
fraud does not require showing materiality; any knowingly false
statement will do.66 That is a ruling about substantive criminal
law, but the most important thing about it is its procedural effect.
Materiality is a standard; there are arguments to be had about
whether a given lie is material. “No telling lies,” by contrast, is a

62 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2464, 2470–72 (2004).
63 Cf. Stuntz, supra note 1, at 529–33.
64 Id. at 523–29.
65 Id. at 510.
66 Wells, 519 U.S. at 489–500.
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rule: so long as the facts are sufficient to show that the defendant
made a false statement and knew it, the defendant has no real
moves to make. In a world with a materiality requirement, people
who lie in ways that are arguably immaterial have some leverage:
they can either insist on trial or—by threatening to insist on
trial—secure more generous plea deals, which in turn means that
prosecutors are less likely to charge them in the first place. In a
world without a materiality requirement, people who lie in any
way to a bank have no reasonable choice but to plead guilty, which
makes those cases slam dunks and, in turn, makes plea bargains
easy to obtain. Thus, standards throw a monkey wrench in a regime of plea bargaining. A criminal law of “What did you know and
when did you know it?” is a criminal law that favors prosecutors.
What effect does this second pathology—this pathology of incentives—have on criminal statutes’ text? First is that criminal
statutes’ text is predictably broader and easier to prove than any
reasonable conception of criminal justice would support. But more
theoretically important is this: the text of criminal statutes often
does not specify what legislatures actually want to see punished.
Legislatures have an incentive to write text that is not meant to
be followed to the letter.
In a classic article, Professor H.L.A. Hart considered the challenge for legal positivism posed by open-ended legal rules like “no
vehicles in the park.”67 Surely that rule should not be taken to
forbid strollers and wheelchairs; does that imply a necessary connection between what the law is and what it ought to be? Hart
thought no, Professor Lon Fuller thought yes,68 and the example
has been a staple of jurisprudential writing ever since. Let’s think
about that example from a criminal law perspective. If “no vehicles in the park” were interpreted to include strollers and wheelchairs, and if the law were enforced, there would be a parents’
lobby and a disability lobby to press for legislative change. But if
“no vehicles in the park” were given to prosecutors as an instrument by which to fight drug dealing in the park (say the drugs
were being sold from motorized scooters) and never enforced
against parents or the handicapped, who would press to fix it?
The statute could even define “vehicle” to include “any artificial
mode of carriage whatsoever” or “any artifact with wheels” (which
67 H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 607 (1957).
68 Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630, 663–64 (1958).
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would include even children’s toys), and however obvious it is that
no legislature would want to see that law enforced according to
its terms, there would be no reason to fix it so long as prosecutors
used it only to go after drug dealers.
In fact, the situation is worse than there being merely no reason to fix it: There would be good reason to draft it in just that
way because one of the law’s advantages would be that prosecutors would not have to prove anything about drugs—neither that
the defendant had drugs (thus avoiding Fourth Amendment problems) nor that the defendant intended to deal them (thus avoiding
mens rea problems). And what if someone were to go by on a bicycle, or even a motorized scooter, who did not appear to be a drug
dealer? Police and prosecutors would be free not to enforce the law.
Far-fetched? Maybe not. That is essentially how the U.S.
criminal system works with respect to speeding tickets and other
traffic violations. It is also how federal misrepresentation statutes can “criminalize, basically, all serious breaches of fiduciary
duty” and “most lies (and, as just noted, almost-but-not-quite-lies)
one might tell during the course of any financial transaction or
transaction involving the government.”69 Collusive incentives give
legislators an incentive to write law that does not accurately describe the thing they mean to stop. The statutes do not mean what
they say. Rule-oriented textualism is a bad fit for statutes that do
not mean what they say and are not meant to be enforced according to their terms.
C. Crime at Retail, Crime at Wholesale
There is a third pathology in the politics of making criminal
law that bears on the quality of statutory text in a somewhat
looser way. The pathology has to do with psychological patterns
and institutional competencies. When judges make law interpretively in the context of criminal cases, they hear from both sides.70
They see the faces and sometimes hear the stories of the defendants. And they take issues at retail (at the level of the case) rather
than at wholesale (at the level of the rule). By contrast, legislatures in the criminal context do not typically hear from both
sides—there is no defense attorney paid to make a case for the
accused—and they always work at wholesale.

69
70

Stuntz, supra note 1, at 524, 517.
See id. at 541.

2021]

Textual Rules in Criminal Statutes

1811

One effect of these retail/wholesale differences is to make
criminal offenders faceless abstractions in legislative contexts—
“the kidnapper,” “the drug dealer,” “the carjacker.” Empirical research into intuitions about criminal guilt and punishment show
that people tend to be harsher when thinking about crimes in the
abstract, as when they vote, and milder when thinking about concrete situations, as when they serve on juries.71 It is not totally
clear why. One reason, I suspect, is patterns in how empathy and
fear work. Individual defendants present as human beings who
have done wrongs, which makes it possible to see their humanity
alongside their wrongs and to appreciate that, for all but a few of
them, their criminality is something they did rather than something they are.72 What flows into the empty space of the faceless
offender is a set of images that come from fear and condemnatory
anger. Legislators are people too, subject to the same patterns of
thought that lead most people’s intuitions to be more severe at
wholesale. The difference is that legislators, unlike judges, always work at wholesale.
In addition, the question that criminal legislation typically
presents is different from the one that criminal cases typically
present. Criminal law has a fundamentally suppressive character; it is a series of “thou shalt nots” coupled with punishments.
Not all law has that character: commercial legislation might be
about structuring a market, educational legislation about holding
schools to account, health and welfare legislation about distributing scarce resources. But in criminal legislation, the question
that legislators face is, “How determined am I to condemn and
put a stop to this evil?” In such a context, the degree of one’s severity can seem to be a measure of one’s commitment to the victims and rights violated by the crime. The legislator who opts for
narrower and milder rather than broader and harsher prohibitions with respect to, say, child pornography can easily be seen as
indifferent to the wrongness of child pornography and to the children hurt by it. The logic of a certain crude form of utilitarianism
particularly bends in this direction: If one’s sole goal is to stop a

71 Cf. Matthew B. Kugler, Friederike Funk, Judith Braun, Mario Gollwitzer, Aaron
C. Kay & John M. Darley, Differences in Punitiveness Across Three Cultures: A Test of
American Exceptionalism in Justice Attitudes, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1071, 1086–
88 (2013) (discussing concrete factors in cross-cultural views of sentencing).
72 See Jennifer L. Goetz, Dacher Keltner & Emiliana Simon-Thomas, Compassion:
An Evolutionary Analysis and Empirical Review, 136 PYSCH. BULL. 351, 366–67 (2010)
(discussing how compassion shapes moral judgment).
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certain type of crime, why shouldn’t the answer to every legislative question be “more”? (Students who describe themselves as
utilitarian, in my experience, typically opt for harsh punishment
on just this logic.) By contrast, the legal question presented to a
judge in the guilt stage of a criminal case is not “How do I put a
stop to this evil?” but “Is the defendant’s behavior the kind of evil
that this statute is designed to suppress?” That shift in question
opens up pathways to nuance and mildness less clearly available
in abstract rulemaking contexts.
Political pressures specific to the criminal context also tend
to put legislators in a problematic position and judges in a better
one. Criminal offenders are politically unpopular, and not just because of tough-on-crime cultural politics in the United States.
That politics ebbs and flows, but serious crime is by its nature an
attack on the social order; Emile Durkheim argued that societies
define as criminal that which “offends the strong, well-defined
states of the collective consciousness.”73 It is just a fact of human
social life, Durkheim thought, that normally acculturated people
will be alarmed and excited to condemnation in the face of such
threats: “[C]rime disturbs those feelings that in any one type of
society are to be found in every healthy consciousness,” spurring
a “passionate reaction,” the satisfaction of which through punishment is “expiation.”74 This aspect of crime’s nature intersects in a
disturbing way with the electoral logic of democratic politics: politicians are presented with an evil that the public wants stamped
out, and elected politicians must please their constituencies.
By contrast, the courage incident to the judicial office has always been connected to protecting the rights of criminal defendants. As Justice Scalia has written: “Judges are sometimes called
upon to be courageous. . . . Their most significant roles, in our system, are to protect the individual criminal defendant.”75 To note
this is not to exaggerate judges’ compassion for criminal defendants. One cannot teach or practice criminal law without noticing
how often judges give criminal defendants the back of their hand.
Furthermore, many judges are elected and must please constituencies too. But as a relative matter, judges are better positioned
to act on defendants’ behalf than legislators, and the ideal of
73 EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 39 (W.D. Halls trans.,
1984) (1933).
74 Id. at 34, 48, 46 (emphasis omitted).
75 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. C HI. L. R EV. 1175,
1180 (1989).
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standing up for criminal defendants is part of judges’ conception
of their role in a way that it is not part of legislators’ conception
of their role. Of the many problems besetting American criminal
law and contributing to mass incarceration, judicial harshness is
very far from the main one.
Finally, judges in criminal cases operate under a set of constitutional and statutory constraints with no legislative parallel.
I am often asked why nontextual interpretive approaches do not
free judges to make criminal law harsher as easily as it frees them
to make criminal law milder. The answer is that judges occasionally do enlarge criminal law’s reach by interpretation, but they do
so rarely and to limited effect because judges are hemmed in both
by the constitutional principle that judges cannot create crimes
(including by statutory enlargement)76 and by the interpretive
principle of the rule of lenity.77 Empirical research shows that
judges are vividly aware of these constraints and take them seriously.78 The two together mean that judges can interpretively constrict a criminal statute but cannot enlarge it. Judges’ interpretive power is thus mostly one-way. Legislatures, by contrast, can
just as easily expand criminal law as contract it.
What are the implications of this abstract rulemaking context and the psychological patterns it invites for criminal statutes’
text? Simply that the statutes will often be excessively and
thoughtlessly punitive—more thoughtless and more punitive
than those same legislators would have written in more concrete
and textured circumstances. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
Enlightenment thinkers were often great fans of code law and
critics of common law, in part because they regarded so highly the
abstract rationality of code-based lawmaking.79 But in criminal
law, the code-based approach puts legislatures at their worst, and
the case-based approach puts courts at their best.

76 See, e.g., Skilling, 561 U.S. at 415 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting the long-accepted
principle that the federal judiciary has no legitimate “power to define new federal crimes”).
77 See, e.g., id. at 410–11; Stuntz, supra note 1, at 561–65.
78 See Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A
Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298,
1331–32 (2018).
79 See, e.g., Letter from Jeremy Bentham to James Madison (Sept. 1817),
https://perma.cc/4G7L-KJVT (offering to codify the entirety of U.S. common law on the
grounds that only a rational legal code is worthy of an Enlightenment republic).
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***
Bringing these threads together, what one sees is a set of political pathologies that are not all unique to criminal law, but that
are in combination quite distinctive and that will predictably be
felt in the text of legislation. Collusive incentives mean that everyone with power has a stake in making statutes textually overbroad and overharsh—indeed, unreasonably broad and harsh not
just from the standpoint of general principles of criminal justice
but also from the standpoint of what legislatures actually want to
see punished. The psychological and electoral context means that
legislators will often be at their worst in the criminal context. And
political imbalance means that there will typically be no lobby to
push back against the punitive and careless overbreadth.
The effect of rule-oriented textualism in criminal law is thus
to unleash a set of statutes that are predictably broader, harsher,
and more carelessly drafted than any reasonable legislature
would want to see enforced. One reason criminal lawyers have
something distinctive to contribute to the “statutory interpretation wars”80 is that, when criminal lawyers think about statutory
interpretation, they have in view, not the great landmark statutes of the age, but these ugly, messy afterthought statutes by
which legislators empower executive officials to deal with a group
of people who are hated at retail and powerless at wholesale.
Should that matter? If a theory of statutory interpretation is just
an abstract ideology, immune to facts on the ground, perhaps
not. But if a theory of statutory interpretation is supposed to be
an instrument of good governance, then arguments like these—
arguments about theory’s consequences—should matter. Why
be a textualist in an area of law in which statutory text is so
predictably bad?
II. TEXTUALISM AND PUNITIVENESS
What do technical arguments about statutory interpretation
have to do with punitiveness? Does focusing on the refined interpretive work that is mainly the province of appellate courts shed
light on the vast criminal justice machine churning out thousands
of sentences for every one appellate case like Brogan, Chapman,
Bond, or Yates?

80 Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1756 (2010).
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The answer is that statutory method sets into motion a procedural cascade that affects criminal justice at every level. Purposive and other nontextualist interpretive methods at the top of
the system foster a sensible and often merciful orientation to considerations of what criminal law is for throughout the system.
Rule-oriented textualism at the top unleashes a punitiveness at
the bottom that is no less harsh for being technocratic.
For example, consider Brogan—the case of the “exculpatory
no” in federal false-statements law.81 A case like Brogan is visible,
judicially managed, and rare. But if the meaning of “any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statements”82 is understood literally—if
there is no “exculpatory no” exception, nor an exception for trivial
or immaterial falsehoods, because “any” just means “any,” full
stop83—then defense attorneys have no argument to make when
their client has, say, lied about having an affair in the course of
an interrogation about whether he cheated on his taxes. That
means that there is no argument to make on the defendant’s behalf at trial, no chance to tell a judge or jury that he is not the
sort of person that the statute is meant to target—no room for
defense attorneys to maneuver. That, in turn, means that the defendant, as a practical matter, must plead guilty—and not on favorable terms—because the defense has no leverage. If, however,
there is a real question about whether the defendant’s false statement is the kind of wrong that the statute is meant to target, a
defense attorney would have the option of putting the issue to a
judge and then (if he has any skill) a jury, which would mean that
he might win at trial. That possibility means that if his case were
to plead, it would do so on terms that are more favorable to the
defendant. These are crucial differences in a criminal system in
which 95% of felony convictions are obtained via plea84 and in
which there are hundreds of mechanically handled misdemeanors
for every one felony.85
The effect of a case like Brogan on plea bargaining is even
more vivid in mass justice settings. I have sometimes practiced
criminal defense at an urban courthouse that processes thousands of cases per year involving mostly poor defendants accused

81

See supra notes 11–21 and accompanying text.
Brogan, 522 U.S. at 400 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1001).
83 Id. at 400–01
84 See STUNTZ, supra note 47, at 7.
85 See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66
STAN. L. REV. 611, 629–31 (2014).
82
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mainly of violent and property crimes. In thinking about an interpretive approach’s concrete effects in criminal law, it’s important
to focus on these settings because they are the origin points from
which mass incarceration comes and because statutory interpretation is different at the top and bottom of the legal system.
My courthouse is an ecosystem of mechanically applied textual rules, not because of the interpretive ideology of nationally
known judges but because it is a bureaucracy, and rule-oriented
textualism is the form of governance that bureaucracies find congenial.86 What that statutory method means in an urban courthouse like mine is that defendants who violated a rule but have
good equitable arguments to offer find themselves with no legal
room to maneuver. The issue might be (as it was for one of my
clients) whether to revoke conditional release based on a statute
that reads: “In the event the person violates any of the conditions
of such order, the court shall revoke the conditional release.”87
That is precisely the Brogan issue—a perfect mirror of the very
top of the legal system from the very bottom. Does it matter, legally speaking, if the violation was minor, understandable, or unconnected with the crime that landed my client in conditional release in the first place? On a text-and-rule approach, the answer
is no. On an equity-and-purpose approach, the answer is yes. And
so it goes in innumerable other cases because a “them’s the rules”
interpretive approach is highly punitive in a massive, machinelike bureaucracy whose widgets—the things at the end of the production line—are punishments.
Purposive and other nontextualist interpretive approaches,
by contrast, are antibureaucratic. They are a monkey wrench in
the machine because they make guilt nonmechanical. They primarily avail those criminal defendants who have good equitable
cases to offer but are technically guilty in a rule-and-text system.

86 Max Weber famously argued that bureaucracies govern by means of general rules
applied to particular cases, as opposed to prudential judgment, individualized moral evaluation, or a “concrete balancing of interests.” MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 217–
26, 267, 290, 758–63, 956–58, 973–75 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds. & trans., 1978)
(1922). It is odd that Weber’s understanding of bureaucracy and modern formalists’ preference for non-discretionary forms of law should line up this way. Justice Scalia’s mission
was to curb judicial abuse, not to make the world safe for bureaucracy. But I wonder if he
ended up doing both.
87 Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/9(e) (2013).
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They help, in other words, precisely those with the best claims of
justice against mass incarceration’s excesses.88
Thus, judges’ approach to statutory interpretation does carry
consequences for the punitiveness of U.S. criminal law, even in
cases that plead out and never see a trial, let alone an appeal. In
the criminal system, judges do not direct most case outcomes. But
they set expectations for how substantive criminal law will be
read, and what follows their statutory style is a procedural cascade in favor of mechanical guilt on the text-and-rule approach or
nonmechanical and individualized assessment on the equity-andpurpose side. The whole system of criminal justice bends and
flexes with the approach taken to statutory interpretation. The
turn to rule-oriented textualism has thus underwritten a technocratic punitiveness that contributes to the present crisis of
American criminal justice—a marginal factor, to be sure, but not
an insignificant one.
There is one major difference in statutory interpretation as
one shifts from major federal appellate cases like Brogan,
Marshall, Yates, and Bond to run-of-the-mill plea-bargained cases
in state courts—but it is not one that casts rule-oriented textualism
in a favorable light. When I discuss the ideas in this Article with
judges and scholars who endorse formalist approaches in statutory
interpretation, they often respond by pointing out resources
within their tradition that could, in their view, blunt or overcome
the problems on which my arguments focus. And they suggest
that I have confused rule-oriented textualism with literalism.
Now, I think there is a marked tendency among formalists to
exaggerate the extent to which the subtle resources they cite would
really work and, indeed, to exaggerate the airspace between ruleoriented textualism and mere literalism.89 (Justice Scalia was on
the wrong side of Brogan, Chapman, Yates, and—with respect to
the relevant issues of statutory interpretation—Bond. Evidently,
rule-oriented textualism produces literalist absurdities some of
the time.) But set those doubts aside. Perhaps the sophisticated
text-and-rule advocates are right: perhaps their interpretive tradition contains sophisticated resources with which to overcome
my objections.
88 Professor Josh Bowers argues, similarly, that some criminal defendants are legally
guilty but normatively innocent and that prosecutors should use “equitable discretion” not
to prosecute in such cases. See generally Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence,
and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655 (2010).
89 See Scalia, supra note 31, at 23–25 (defending textualism as formalism).

1818

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:8

The problem is that the version of rule-oriented textualism
that prevails in the ordinary criminal courthouses of the criminal
justice machine is not the subtle stuff of visionary jurists like
Easterbrook and Scalia. It’s a kind of “them’s the rules” approach
one might get from the TSA at the airport or test administrators
at a standardized exam. For purposes of statutory theory, it’s important to examine rule-oriented textualism at its best. But when
it comes to theory’s consequences, the question is how a statutory
method affects the everyday practice of the ordinary, overworked,
underpaid lawyers and judges who make up most of the criminal
bar. Criminal defendants cannot access textualism at its best.
They cannot afford it. One of the things that money buys in law
is statutory nuance. Textualism at the top of the legal profession
means literalism at the bottom.
III. PATHOLOGICAL POLITICS AND TEXTUALIST VALUES
Rule-oriented textualism was built on ideas about democratic
legitimacy. The very thesis of Justice Scalia’s A Matter of Interpretation is that textualism is a democracy’s interpretive methodology because it restores lawmaking authority to legislatures.90
“[T]he Mr. Fix-it mentality of the common-law judge is a sure recipe for incompetence and usurpation,” Scalia writes, because
what the common law judge is fundamentally doing is “playing
king,” and what’s wrong with that is a little “trend in government
that has developed in recent centuries, called democracy.”91 When
a common law mentality is brought into statutory interpretation,
“under the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue
their own objectives and desires.”92
Scalia’s rule-based orientation rests on these same democratic ideas. Textualism is not necessarily rule-oriented: text can
express principles and standards as easily as it can rules. But
principles and standards inevitably invite judges to think in
terms of values. If a statute says that police in a violent encounter
may use only “proportional” force or the level of force “a reasonable person would think necessary,” judges cannot help but draw
on some understanding of proportionality and reasonableness to
apply the legislative directive to a case. A requirement that the

90
91
92

See Scalia, supra note 36, at 9–14.
Id. at 14, 7, 9.
Id. at 17–18.
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president be thirty-five years old, by contrast, does not invite reference to values. Thus, a textualism motivated as Scalia’s is—a
textualism aimed at reducing values-based judicial discretion—
must be joined to a law of rules if it is to accomplish its antidiscretionary mission.
Scalia did this in The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules—and did
it so smoothly that it is easy to overlook the separateness of the
two elements, textualism and rule orientation, being joined. The
rhetorical device was threefold. First was to frame the debate
about rules just as he had framed the debate about text, as the
rule of law versus judicial discretion: “It is this dichotomy between ‘general rule of law’ and ‘personal discretion to do justice’
that I wish to explore.”93 Second was to ally the rule of law with
democracy: “In a democratic system, of course, the general rule of
law has special claim to preference, since it is the normal product
of that branch of government most responsive to the people.”94
Third was to advance the idea—a heterodox idea in a legal system
as suffused with principles and standards as the U.S. one—that
the rule of law is a law of rules.
There are, in other words, two perennial debates in statutory
theory—between rules and standards, on the one hand, and between text and purpose on the other. The two are orthogonal;
there is no necessary connection between them. Scalia’s genius
was to marry a formalist legal methodology grounded in the twin
pillars of text and rules to a forceful and moving conception of
democratic legitimacy. Rule-oriented textualism of the type I critique in this Article thus emerges as the answer to a question:
What mode of judging most empowers legislatures and most restrains judges? The answer is that judges should treat statutes as
repositories of textually expressed rules and apply those rules
without regard to the values on which the judges think the rules
are based. And why read statutes that way? Because valuesbased judicial discretion is undemocratic. Democratic theory is
thus the normative foundation of the text-and-rule approach, at
least in the Scalia-Easterbrook tradition.
I do not mean in this argument to take issue with ruleoriented textualism’s conception of the judicial role in a democracy. I am, for present purposes, agnostic on that score. My claim
is that, because of criminal law’s peculiar political economy, the

93
94

Scalia, supra note 75, at 1176.
Id.
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democratic shoe in the criminal context is on the other foot: the
text-and-rule approach to statutory interpretation is less democratic than at least some nontextualist approaches.
To see why, we must first resist the seductive but serious
oversimplification of thinking that “democracy” just means “legislatures”—that democracy is whatever legislatures do. That intuition—call it the “intuition for parliamentary supremacy”—is
not the whole truth about democracy for at least four reasons that
are all at issue in criminal law. First, legislative processes can
themselves be flawed in ways that undermine democratic governance.95 Second, democratic government in the American tradition
requires checks and balances, not just legislative power.96 Third,
democratic government presupposes those rights necessary for
democracy itself to function (e.g., political equality and freedom
of speech).97 Fourth, legislative processes and other governmental
systems are ultimately means by which to effectuate the end of selfgovernment, and the judgment of whether a society is functionally
democratic must ultimately be a holistic judgment about whether
the people within that society are genuinely self-governing.98 Each
of these four ideas is associated with a rich body of democratic
theory.99 Let us take them up in turn with special reference to the
pathological politics of criminal law.
As to flaws in legislative processes themselves, criminal legislation suffers from a Carolene Products–John Hart Ely problem
of the first order. Footnote four of United States v. Carolene
Products100 famously suggested that “prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”101 Where
democratic processes break down in ways that constrict a group’s
95

See HART & SACKS, supra note 37, at 693–98, 705–06.
See id. at 682.
97 See id. at 708.
98 See id. at 710–13.
99 See Joshua Kleinfeld, Three Principles of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U.
L. REV. 1455, 1465 (2017) (distinguishing theories of democracy that see democracy “in
terms of governmental processes,” “in terms of advancing liberal values,” and “in terms of
collective self-determination, popular sovereignty, and self-government, and therefore focus[ed] on whether the views of the people who make up the political community are reflected in their law”).
100 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
101 Id. at 152–53 n.4. Carolene Products and Ely were focused on judicial review, not
statutory interpretation, but the arguments, I submit, fit both contexts.
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access to government (imagine, for example, a majority voting
away a minority’s right to vote), an active judicial hand is not antidemocratic but “representation-reinforcing.”102 Judges in such
cases are not substituting their own values for those of the
people’s representatives but protecting the democratic political
process itself.
With that argument in mind, consider the situation of criminal defendants and convicts competing in the legislative arena
with prosecutors (whose interests are aligned with legislators),
police, and prison personnel. On one side is a group of governmental officials with distorted and collusive incentives who collectively constitute a substantial portion of the political class. On the
other side is a group of people who are typically poor and often
ethnic minorities, who must operate in secret and therefore cannot advocate publicly for their interests, who often do not know
that they will be members of the interest group in question, who
are widely hated, who can legally be discriminated against in employment and other contexts, and—the Elyian kicker—who often
lose upon conviction the very right to vote. Criminal defendants
are one of the purest examples in American politics of a discrete
and insular minority subject to structural disadvantages in the
political process. In these circumstances, it is representation reinforcing for judges to take a larger role. And while Ely had in
mind judicial review and not statutory interpretation, his argument applies as much to the one as to the other.
Second, the U.S. democratic tradition has never been one of
pure parliamentary supremacy but one of checks and balances,
and criminal legislation is disordered in ways that lead to largely
unchecked executive power. Plea bargaining and prosecutorial
discretion mean that legislatures have an incentive to pass criminal statutes designed to empower prosecutors rather than identify wrongdoing that the legislature actually wants stopped. Thus
the legislature and executive collude rather than check each
other: “Legislatures are no check on prosecutorial power, because
legislators and prosecutors mostly share the same interests.”103 So
falls one branch. But that isn’t all; plea bargaining substantially
excludes the judiciary from overseeing criminal justice. So falls
the next branch. Even that isn’t all; this structure disables not
only the judiciary but also the criminal jury because trial juries
102 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
87–88, 102 (1980).
103 Stuntz, supra note 1, at 599.
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have no place in a world of plea bargains. That might not seem so
significant in the twenty-first century, as we have become accustomed to the jury’s diminishment, but it would have been seen as
significant at the Founding: the jury was understood at that time
as a directly popular check on all three branches of government,
rooted in a participatory understanding of democracy in which
the people take the reins of government directly rather than
through representatives.104 To disable the jury is also to move
criminal cases out of a physical space—the courtroom—guaranteed as public by the Constitution105 and into a closed-door world
of lawyers and officials. This disables the public and media as a
final source of oversight.
Thus crumbles the whole structure of checks and balances.
In effect, legislatures vacate their responsibility to write fully
specified law and, in so doing, empower prosecutors to evade
judges, juries, media, and the voting public in exactly the context—crime and punishment—in which unchecked executive
power is most fearsome. Just what is democratic about that?
Third, with respect to the rights that democratic governance
presupposes, I think it is difficult to maintain that U.S. criminal
legislation today does a good job of advancing the causes of equality, individual liberty, or the rule of law. The racial character of
mass incarceration offends the cause of equality. The country’s
astonishing incarceration rate offends the cause of liberty. And
the strategic use of prosecutorial discretion, plea bargaining, and
broad criminalization offends the rule of law; the consequence of
making criminal law so broad as to criminalize socially normal
forms of misbehavior is to equip executive officials with vast discretionary power and subject many or most citizens to the standing possibility of executive interference. To lodge that level of unchecked power over individuals in the executive is
antidemocratic.
Finally, turning to the ideal of democracy as collective selfdetermination and popular sovereignty—from the particular governmental processes that are democracy’s means to the ideal of
self-government that is democracy’s end—rule-oriented textualism makes criminal law alien to the people living under it. At the
center of a “We the People” conception of democracy is an

104 See Laura I Appleman, Local Democracy, Community Adjudication, and Criminal
Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1413, 1417 (2017).
105 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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“authorial ideal”:106 the community living under the law must be
able to rationally see itself as the law’s author.107 Yet American
criminal statutes, taken at face value, are commonly inconsistent
with ordinary social norms. For example, the age of sexual consent in California is eighteen years old and there is no close-inage exception: two seventeen-year-olds who have sex have, as a
legal matter, raped one another.108 But, in the United States, the
average age at which people lose their virginity is seventeen.109
Another example: when smoking marijuana was criminal in the
vast majority of states, more than a third of Americans admitted
to having smoked it.110 Such statutes, literally interpreted and
regularly enforced, would make the law alien to the people who
are supposed to be its author. Pathological politics has created a
criminal law that we cannot experience as our own.
I can imagine an objection to this line of argument: “Maybe
criminal statutes are indeed broad and severe,” the objection
might go, “and maybe it’s unfortunate that they are. But it
is nonetheless the case that overbreadth and severity are what
legislatures want and, in turn, what the tough-on-crime U.S. public wants. Respecting that overbreadth and severity therefore is
democratic.” Criminal law, the argument concludes, might be a
context in which democracy is not at its best, but that doesn’t
make criminal legislation undemocratic.
This argument has a sort of deflationary appeal. It seems
worldly and hardheaded, which can make it seem true. But it is
false. The empirical evidence on public opinion indicates that the
American public, evaluating criminal cases at retail (in the context of specific fact patterns), consistently favors less severe punishments than those dictated by American law.111 Even at
106

Kleinfeld, supra note 99, at 1472.
See Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L.
REV. 1367, 1385 (2017) (“The fundamental idea [behind deliberative democracy] is one of
authorship: where the community makes the law out of its own convictions, the community can truly be seen as self-governing; the people can rationally see themselves as the
law’s author.”).
108 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 2021).
109 See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Key Statistics from the National Survey of Family Growth, (Apr. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/K8LW-3W6J.
110 See Lydia Saad, In U.S., 38% Have Tried Marijuana, Little Changed Since ’80s,
GALLUP (Aug. 2, 2013), https://perma.cc/Q2RF-4S5X.
111 In one illustrative study, subjects were given a set of real-world fact patterns involving crimes of varying severity and then asked to assign whatever sentences the subjects believed appropriate. The subjects gave consistently and significantly more lenient sentences
than the law in fact prescribes. Paul H. Robinson, Democratizing Criminal Law: Feasibility,
Utility, and the Challenge of Social Change, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1565, 1576 (2017).
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wholesale, broad and severe criminal drug laws are unpopular,112
as are broad and severe copyright laws (very few people really
think copyright infringers should go to prison for up to five years
per count, as the FBI warning at the beginning of every movie
threatens).113 It seems unlikely that this same public would favor
criminalizing the kind of “marginal middle-class misbehavior”
that criminal law routinely does criminalize.114 Nor, presumably,
would they favor sentences as irrational as the LSD sentencing
scheme in Marshall, nor prosecutions as contrary to social
norms as Bond and Yates. Nor would they likely favor an overall
arrangement of substance and procedure designed to empower
prosecutors with vast discretion and evade jury trials.
Actually, given the political structures in which criminal statutes are written, one cannot even say that statutory text genuinely reflects the views and values of legislatures, since the statutes are commonly written to give prosecutors leverage rather
than to describe the wrongs that legislatures actually want to
eliminate. I concede that legislatures might genuinely favor an
overall arrangement of criminal justice under which prosecutors
use broad and severe criminal statutes as tools with which to secure plea bargains (thus providing a lot of criminal convictions at
a low price). But that is too thin a reed to support the idea that
applying particular criminal statutes in a rule-and-text way better
reflects democratic values than would a less textualist approach.
I can imagine a second objection: “You underestimate the
problem of judges just ‘making it up’—pretending to interpret the
law but really rewriting it to suit their values. Maybe criminal
legislation is textually flawed, but judicial power unconstrained
by formal methods is worse than those flaws.” I acknowledge the
force of this concern, but I think that it’s crucial to realize that
typical criminal statutes are different from the kind of landmark
statutes that often motivate concerns about judicial usurpation.
A major case about, say, how to interpret the Affordable Care Act
could, in a stroke, alter the balance of rights and duties for millions of people after hundreds of elected officials spent months
negotiating on behalf of hundreds of millions of constituents,
who were themselves engaged in intensive public debate. When
112 See Pew Rsch. Ctr., America’s New Drug Policy Landscape (Apr. 2, 2014),
https://perma.cc/CRL6-WCWW.
113 See JOE KARAGNIS & LENNART RENKEMA, AM. ASSEMBLY, COPY CULTURE IN THE
U.S. & GERMANY 30–31, 40–41 (2013), https://perma.cc/L6TM-6KR7.
114 Stuntz, supra note 1, at 509.
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rule-oriented textualists find something democratically objectionable about judicial power in such a context, they have a point.
But criminal cases just aren’t like that. A big case might narrow the reach of the federal complicity statute (“Whoever . . . aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures [an offense
against the United States] . . . is punishable as a principal.”)115
such that, if two people are engaged in a crime together and one
of them pulls a gun that the other doesn’t know about, the latter
person is only guilty of the initial crime, not the additional gun
crime.116 Statutory interpretation in criminal law typically involves significant considerations of justice but at a very small and
tightly constrained scale. It is not a context in which complaints
of judicial usurpation make sense.
In sum, the democratic arguments on which rule-oriented
textualism substantially rests do not work in the criminal context. What is really democratic is to read criminal statutes equitably and flexibly enough to reinforce representative government
for a group otherwise denied full access to the political process; to
preserve the system of checks and balances, including jury trials,
that constrain executive power; to protect the individual rights on
which democratic government is based; and to keep the law in
application consistent with ordinary social norms so that democratic citizens can recognize the law as their own. In short, equity
and purpose are, in criminal law, more democratic than text and
rules.
CONCLUSION
The basic claim of this Article is a “bad fit” claim. The cello is
a great instrument, but it’s a bad fit if you’re playing the blues.
Rule-oriented textualism may have many virtues in other areas
of law, but it’s a bad fit for criminal law. Furthermore, the reasons
that it is a bad fit for criminal law track features of criminal law’s
peculiar politics that are moderately distinctive taken individually and quite distinctive taken as a set.
The structure of this argument suggests that approaches to
statutory interpretation should be sensitive to the distinctiveness
of other areas of law as well. If the reasons relevant to an interpretive approach’s merits are partly department-of-law specific, it follows that interpretive approaches cannot be evaluated without
115
116

18 U.S.C. § 2(a).
See Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 70–81 (2014) (analyzing 18 U.S.C. § 2).
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regard to the department of law in which they are applied. That is
indeed the larger perspective on statutory interpretation that I
wish to advance in this Article—that there is value in thinking
about statutory interpretation from the standpoint of the particular departments of law whose statutes are at issue rather than
in the abstract and for all of law. Criminal law thus offers a useful
perspective in the statutory interpretation wars. And since criminal law is such a significant part of the overall structure of law—
not so much a room in the cathedral as a wing—it should unsettle
sweeping theories of statutory interpretation that cannot accommodate criminal law’s special features.
At the same time, “distinctive” does not mean “unique.” There
are other areas of law that share at least some of criminal law’s
peculiarities, and there are areas of law that do not. What makes
rule-oriented textualism such a bad fit for criminal law is the combination of dysfunctional legislative politics with a comprehensively moralized form of law—that is, a form of law for which
moral concerns lie not only at the root of the field (which might
be true of many areas of law) but also characterize virtually every
individual application, token, occurrence, or issuance of the field.
Rule-oriented textualism is a bad fit for areas of law with dysfunctional politics and highly moralized content.
Are there other areas of law for which those two features
hold? Immigration and refugee law might be an example. There,
as in criminal law, the group most affected by the law is typically
unable to avail itself of the democratic process, and the moral
goals of the law seem to be fairly close to the surface. A “refugee,”
for example, is statutorily defined as someone unable or unwilling
to return to his or her home country “because of persecution or
a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.”117 Much of that definition involves moralized language.
By contrast, securities law seems like an area in which the moral
purposes of the law are less immediately relevant to legal interpretation; the various groups with an interest in the legislation
have access to the democratic process, and those competing interests hammer out compromises in the form of legislative rules,
which judges might best respect by enforcing them as written.
Ultimately, however, I am agnostic about which departments
of law outside the criminal domain are best paired with which
117
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statutory method because, if this Article’s argument is right, the
choice of statutory method within an area of law requires fairly
detailed knowledge of how that area of law works. Legal scholarship is filled with theories of how particular departments of law
do and should function. The unanswered question is what those
theories mean for statutory interpretation.

